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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Johnson appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his second successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals previously described the facts of the 
underlying case as follows: 
The facts of this case show a very gruesome attack carried 
out jointly by Petersen and Johnson over a two-hour period. In 
inteNiews conducted by investigators and in statements to the 
court, Petersen and Johnson each attributed the most violent acts 
to the other. Both denied performing several of the acts that 
eventually lead [sic] to the death of their victims and accused the 
other of committing those acts. The record, according to Petersen, 
sets forth the following scenario. 
During the early morning hours of September 14, 1993, 
Petersen and Johnson entered the home of Ricky Lee Mangum 
and Connie Allen, whom they had met briefly for the first time 
earlier in the evening. Shortly after entering the home, a struggle 
ensued involving both Petersen and Johnson, and Mangum and 
Allen. Mangum was viciously attacked with a tire iron resulting in 
bruises on both hands and gaping lacerations extending deep into 
the skull. After Mangum collapsed to the floor, Petersen tied 
Mangum's arms and legs behind his back using electrical cords. 
Demanding Mangum's money, Petersen took eight dollars from 
Mangum's wallet which was in a vehicle parked outside the 
residence. Mangum's throat was repeatedly slashed by Petersen 
and Johnson as he lay unclothed and tied up on the kitchen floor. 
Mangum's death resulted from the laceration of the carotid artery 
and the right jugular vein. Although Petersen admitted to slashing 
Mangum's throat, causing one of the several smaller lacerations, he 
denied making the deep, gaping cut which killed Mangum. 
Allen was restrained by Johnson while Petersen tied her up with a 
shirt. She was taken into the bedroom where she was raped by 
Petersen and Johnson. Johnson also sodomized her. After being 
raped, Allen's throat was slashed several times, severing the 
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trachea and the right and left jugular veins. Believing Allen was 
dead, Johnson and Petersen dragged her body into the bathroom 
to destroy any evidence that would connect them to the rape. At 
some point Allen revived and began to struggle. She was placed in 
the tub which Petersen had filled with water. Allen was then 
severely beaten with a tire iron fracturing numerous bones and 
lacerating and puncturing her skin. Petersen tied up Allen again 
using an electrical cord, and then held her head under the water in 
the tub. Allen died as a result of the severing of her right and left 
jugular veins. However, contributing factors were fresh water 
aspiration asphyxiation and a severe blow to the head. 
Before leaving the residence, Petersen and Johnson 
attempted to wipe up the blood and destroy any evidence. In 
addition to the eight dollars taken from Mangum's wallet, six dollars 
were stolen from Allen's purse and a jar of change was also 
removed from the house. The tire iron and some bloody clothing 
were thrown into the Big Wood River by Petersen and Johnson as 
they left the scene. 
State v. Johnson, 1 127 Idaho 279, 280-281, 899 P.2d 989, 990-991 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
Pursuant to an I.C.R. 11 written plea agreement, Johnson pied guilty to 
two counts of first degree murder. See Johnson v. State, 1997 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 617, Docket No. 23177, p.1 (Idaho App., July 10, 1997). The district 
court imposed concurrent fixed life sentences. See id. Johnson filed no direct 
appeal. See id. In his initial post-conviction petition, Johnson raised "ten 
assignments of error regarding his counsel's representation during trial 
preparation and plea negotiations." See id., pp.1-2. The district court summarily 
dismissed the petition, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. 
llh, pp.2-8. 
1 While Johnson's name remained in the title of the case, this appeal concerned 
Peterson's challenge to his sentence. Johnson did not challenge his conviction 
or sentence on direct appeal. 
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Approximately 12 years later, Johnson filed a pro se successive petition 
for post-conviction relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.21-27.) The petition was based upon an 
affidavit Johnson received from Peterson, in which Peterson alleged that he was 
solely responsible for the murders, and that "[a]nything [Johnson] did that knight 
[sic] was because I forced him to and I made it very clear I would kill him if he 
didn't do what I said." (R., Vol. I, pp.21-27, 39-40.) Peterson also asserted that 
he provided this information to the prosecutor, police, and his defense attorneys 
prior to Johnson's guilty pleas, but that the state pressured him into changing his 
story to implicate Johnson. (R., Vol. I, pp.39-40.) Based upon this affidavit, 
Johnson asserted: (1) the state withheld Peterson's confession in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) Peterson's confession constituted 
new evidence that required vacation of the conviction or sentence; and (3) his 
initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective for withholding and not utilizing 
Peterson's confession, and due to a conflict of interest. (R., Vol. I, p.22.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Johnson's successive petition. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.192-215.) The court found that Johnson failed to allege facts that, if 
true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. (R., Vol. I, 
pp.202, 206-213.) The district court also concluded that Johnson failed to show 
sufficient reason to justify the filing of the successive petition in two respects: (1) 
the petition was untimely because Johnson failed to file it within a reasonable 
time of becoming aware of Peterson's affidavit; and (2) Johnson failed to 
demonstrate that his post-conviction counsel's performance was deficient. (R., 
Vol. I, pp.202-206.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and the 
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district court's conclusion that the petition was untimely. Johnson v. State, 2011 
Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Docket No. 37378 (Idaho App., August 8, 2011). 
The Court did not reach the merits of Johnson's claims, or Johnson's argument 
that ineffective assistance of his initial post-conviction counsel justified his 
successive petition. See id. 
Johnson then filed a second pro se successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 2 (R., Vol. I, pp.5-20.) Johnson raised the same claims he asserted in his 
first successive petition, and also asserted that he received ineffective assistance 
from his successive post-conviction counsel and his successive post-conviction 
appellate counsel. (Id.) Further, Johnson appeared to argue that his successive 
post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to adequately argue that his 
first successive petition was timely constituted "sufficient reason" to justify the 
filing of his second successive petition. (Id.) 
To support this latter argument, Johnson submitted additional affidavits 
and evidence regarding his efforts to timely to file the first successive petition, 
and evidence of communications between Johnson and his first successive 
petition counsel. (R., Vol. I, pp.28-38, 56-62, 95-100.) The district court 
appointed counsel to represent Johnson "for the limited purpose of addressing 
the issue of res judicata or law of the case as concerns timeliness of a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief and whether there is sufficient 
2 In the interim, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Johnson's petition for review 
from the Court of Appeal's opinion affirming the district court's summary dismissal 
of his first successive petition. (See R., Vol. I, p.223; Vol. 11, pp.265-268, 285.) 
However, after oral argument, the Court ruled that the petition had been 
improvidently granted and dismissed it. (See id.) 
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reason to allow a second successive petition for post-conviction when the court 
has previously determined such claims were untimely asserted." 
(Augmentation:3 4/22/13 "Order Re: Appointment of Counsel.") 
After providing notice, the district court summarily dismissed Johnson's 
second successive post-conviction petition, concluding that Johnson failed to 
demonstrate sufficient reason to justify the filing of the petition. (R., Vol. II, 
pp.283-298.) The court also denied Johnson's subsequent motion for 
reconsideration. (R., Vol. II, pp.319-327.) Johnson timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, 
pp.328-330.) 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Johnson's motion to augment the appellate 
record with the district court's order appointing counsel and several other 
documents that were not included in the clerk's record. (9/10/14 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prior post-conviction counsel's affirmative 
misrepresentations and Mr. Johnson's personal efforts to 
remedy counsel's deficiencies provide sufficient reason 
under I.C. § 19-4908 to justify a successive post-conviction 
relief petition? 
2. Must this case be remanded because the district court erred 
in concluding that Mr. Johnson had not produced sufficient 
evidence to establish an issue of fact as to whether his 
successive petition was filed within a reasonable time and 
the only issues counsel was permitted to address and that 
the district court considered concerned timeliness? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Johnson failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his second successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Johnson contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
second successive post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
However, Johnson's argument that the filing of his second successive petition 
was justified by alleged ineffective assistance of his first post-conviction petition 
counsel is precluded by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murphy v. 
State, 156 Idaho 389, _, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014) (reh'g denied). Further, 
even notwithstanding Murphy. Johnson has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to 
relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. Johnson Failed To Show Sufficient Reason To File A Second Successive 
Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
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burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). 
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the 
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone 
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a 
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the 
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. ~ 
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A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible. 
I.C. § 19-4908 (claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally 
waived). Only in cases where the petitioner can show "sufficient reason" why 
claims were "inadequately presented in the original case," may he have the 
opportunity to re-litigate them. Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 
978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 19-4908. An analysis of 
whether "sufficient reason" exists to file a successive petition includes an analysis 
of whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time" after the petitioner's 
discovery of the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 
904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). "In determining what a reasonable time is for 
filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case 
basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 
P.3d at 875. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent and held 
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot constitute "sufficient 
reason" for filing a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908. Murphy, 156 Idaho 
at _, 327 P.3d at 368-371. The Court reasoned that because, as the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized, there is no constitutional right to an 
attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, even as a 
means of attempting to overcome state procedural hurdles. ~ 
In this case, Johnson argued that his first successive petition counsel was 
ineffective in failing to adequately argue that his first successive petition was 
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timely, and that this ineffectiveness constituted "sufficient reason" under I.C. § 19-
4908 to justify the filing of a second successive petition. (R., Vol. I, pp.5-19.) 
Johnson offered no other justification for the filing of the second successive 
petition. (See id.) Because Murphy precludes the argument upon which the 
validity of Johnson's second successive petition relies, he cannot show error. 
On appeal, Johnson acknowledges Murphy, but attempts to limit its 
application to this case in several ways. First, Johnson notes that if ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel can't give rise to "sufficient reason" under 
I.C. § 19-4908, then the legislature's use of that language would be rendered a 
nullity unless there is some other way to show such reason. (Appellant's brief, 
p.6.) Johnson argues that other such ways include ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel that goes "beyond simple ineffective assistance of counsel." 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Johnson asserts that despite fully informing his first 
successive petition counsel of the efforts Johnson made to file a timely petition, 
counsel "continually led him to believe that the petition would be amended and 
failed to amend the petition," and then ultimately failed to adequately argue the 
timeliness issue to the district court. (Id.) Essentially, Johnson argues that his 
first successive post-conviction counsel's performance was so egregious that 
Murphy does not apply. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently rejected a nearly identical argument 
in Lopez v. State, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 5347372. (Ct. App. 2014) (petition for 
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review pending.)4 Lopez argued that, even in light of Murphy, some claims must 
still constitute "sufficient reason" to file successive petitions lest the legislature's 
use of that language be rendered meaningless. kl at *3. Lopez reasoned that 
the "absence of any meaningful representation," i.e., particularly egregious 
counsel performance, must therefore constitute a "sufficient reason" under I.C. § 
19-4908. kl In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals recognized that the 
Idaho Supreme Court "squarely and unequivocally addressed this issue, leaving 
no room for this Court to craft an exception." kl (citing Murphy, 156 Idaho at 
391, 327 P.3d at 367.) The Court also recognized that there remained avenues 
to demonstrate "sufficient reason" - such as where there is newly discovered 
evidence. 5 kl 
Additionally, Johnson argues that because Murphy had not been issued at 
the time his second successive petition was before the district court, he 
attempted to show that his counsel was ineffective in order to demonstrate 
"sufficient reason" to justify the filing of the second successive petition. 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Therefore, Johnson reasons, should this Court find that 
Murphy precludes his argument, the case should be remanded to allow him the 
opportunity to show his second successive petition was justified by some other 
4 Johnson did not have the benefit of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Lopez 
when he wrote his brief. 
5 Additionally, in Parvin v. State, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 5346783 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(petition for review pending), the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that "unique 
and compelling circumstances," including particularly egregious attorney conduct, 
can still, post-Murphy. be the basis of an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from 
judgment when filed in the course of a petitioner's initial post-conviction 
proceeding (citing Ebyv. State, 148 ldaho731, 734,228 P.3d 998, 1001 (2010)). 
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"sufficient reason." (Id.) However, in both Parvin and Lopez, the district court 
summarily successive dismissed post-conviction petitions prior to the issuance of 
Murphy.6 See Parvin,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 5346783 at *4; Lopez,_ P.3d _, 
2014 WL 5347372 at *4. The Court of Appeals allowed both Parvin and Lopez to 
supplement the appellate briefing in light of Murphy, but ultimately applied 
Murphy in both cases. In both cases, as in the present case, the petitioners 
relied entirely on claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to 
attempt to justify the filing of successive petitions, and were unable to assert 
sufficient alternative reasons in the course of appellate briefing. kl While 
Johnson requests the opportunity to present a different "sufficient reason" below, 
he has not asserted what such a reason might be. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) 
Certainly, none of the evidence regarding his efforts to timely file the first 
successive petition were "newly discovered" by Johnson at the time he filed his 
second successive petition. Because Murphy precludes the argument on which 
Johnson's appeal relies, he cannot show error. 
Further, even notwithstanding Murphy, Johnson's second successive post-
conviction petition was barred. Idaho Code § 19-4908 permits a petitioner to file 
a successive petition where there is "sufficient reason" to justify raising a new 
ground or claim. It does not permit petitioners to re-litigate prior determinations 
that their successive petition was untimely. As the district court recognized, such 
arguments are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Rhoades, 
6 And of course, in Murphy itself, the Idaho Supreme Court applied its holding in 
that case to the district court's summary dismissal of Murphy's successive post-
conviction petition. 
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134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) (The doctrine of res judicata 
prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final 
judgment or decision in an action between the same litigants.). In this case, the 
district court already determined that the first successive petition and the claims 
raised within were untimely (R., Vol. I, pp.202-206), and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed this determination. Johnson, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 
57 4, Docket No. 37378. Idaho Code § 19-4908 and the doctrine of res judicata 
preclude Johnson from now attempting to re-litigate this determination with new 
arguments or previously-known evidence. 
Finally, even notwithstanding Murphy, and even if a successive post-
conviction counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to adequately argue that the 
first successive petition was timely could theoretically constitute sufficient reason 
for the filing of a second successive petition, the district court correctly concluded 
that Johnson failed to demonstrate such grounds in this case. For this 
conclusion, the state adopts the district court's rationale, as stated in its 
Memorandum Decision. (R., Vol. II, pp.283-298.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy precludes the argument on 
which Johnson's appeal relies - that ineffective assistance of successive post-
conviction counsel can constitute sufficient reason to justify the filing of a second 
successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Johnson therefore cannot show 
that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
summarily dismissal of Johnson's second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2014. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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